Introduction
After preliminary analysis it has been discerned that Brazil and Chile are the two, most appropriate countries for K-Fit to hold its first manufacturing plant and retail stores in Latin America. This determination was based on two main factors: a) Brazil makes up half of the economy (GDP) of South America, and one-third of all Latin American countries; and b) Chile has proven to be an excellent “test” market as it is relatively small in size (population) and has a high ease of doing business. The K-Fit Strategic Planning Committee has evaluated these two countries so that corporate officers and the Board of Directors may decide which strategy to deploy in Latin America. Areas under evaluation include political, economic, and cultural environments, as well as bargaining relevancy, prospects for financial crisis, demographic issues, free trade agreements, and geographic location of the plant and stores.
Brazil
Political Assessment
In 2010, Dilma Rouseff won Brazil’s presidency handily over her conservative-party opponent Jose Serra (47 to 33% in the first round, and 56 to 44% in the final round). Rouseff was the “anointed” successor of former president, Luiz Inacio “Lula” da Silva, who left office with unprecedented popularity. Although Lula and Rouseff come from the Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), the Workers Party, they have learned from their predecessors that a market-oriented economy has greatly benefited Brazil. Utilizing the Packenham Model for Assessing Prospects for Economic Reform several aspects of Brazil’s political-economic future can be forecasted (Appendix A:A1).
Under the Packenham Model it is easy to determine that Brazil’s political party system is incredibly fragmented. In the 2010 election, the PT won only 23% of the seats in the Senate while the seats were divided between 15 parties (Appendix A:A2). A fragmented political party system makes radical economic reforms nearly impossible without part coalitions. Although Rouseff has a semi-coalition in government, radical, market-reforms are unlikely leading Rouseff to avoid very “ambitious pro-business measures, such as labour market flexibilisation. Instead she aims to simplify the tax system…Minor incremental reforms will continue to improve the business environment” (EIU Forecast: Brazil, 1). This facet of Brazil’s political system is not necessarily unfortunate. Brazil is maturing as a market-oriented economy, of which its global partners also deal slowly with radical economic reforms; the benefit of a fragmented system is that the country will not easily backtrack into populist ideals and reforms. Furthermore, although the power is fragmented, Lula, and now Rouseff will enjoy a ten-party ruling coalition that holds over 60% of the seats needed to enact the minor reforms her office intends to undertake.
As for Rouseff’s Political Credentials and Leadership Skills, they are quite close to her successful predecessor Lula. Although the incredible charisma Brazilians witnessed under Lula has yet to be seen from Rouseff, she comes from the workersbackground and was even involved with rebel forces during the military governments of the 1970s and 80s (Nelson, Thunderbird RBE). Like Lula, her left-of-center background gives her outstanding credentials to push for market-oriented reforms; no one will accuse her of leaving her roots and doing favors for “big-business”. As well, she represents the third consecutive term for the PT. Lastly, with Lula in her corner (who has remained closely associated with the party and executive office) Rouseff’s popularity should remain high granting her the ability to lead Brazil with the specific reforms she is planning.
Finally, under Packenham’s Model, due to the fragmented political party system, Rouseff does not enjoy a sound political consensus on major reform issues due to the ideological differences between the ten-party alliance. However, depending on Rouseff’s leadership capabilities, this coalition should be able to continue Lula’s minor, market reforms. All in all, Brazil does not have a tremendously long way to go to make business easier – but there are plenty of areas that require minor tweaks.
Economic Assessment
After witnessing the economic rollercoaster Brazil rode around the turn of the 21st century it is hard to believe the economically stable ground the country now rests. Cardoso’s Challenge was to turn Brazil from an economy of populist ideals to one of a free market and growth. Brazil had faced huge budget deficits due to these populist reforms which is the chronic disease that infected most Latin American countries, and still do. Today however, Brazil has gone through reforms including privatizations, budget cuts, civil service reform, state/federal debt reform, and more. However, although Brazil had been included in the BRIC acronym highlighting the four predicted emerging markets of the 21st century (others include Russia, India, and China), and has been growing at a healthy rate, several bureaucratic bottlenecks are forcing the country to under-perform.
A few key issues make up the biggest areas of reform Brazil requires. These include complete social security reform, labor reform, tax reform, as well as infrastructure and education upgrades. For starters Brazil allows federal and state workers to full retirement after very few years in service and disallows government workers to be fired after only five years of employment creating massive inefficiency, requiring more workers to be hired and attend to issues, causing more inefficiency – a vicious cycle. It is also very difficult to fire people in the private sector as well as labor laws are still very populist in ideal. Although this has not kept investors and businesses out of Brazil, it is a major cause of complaint. Likewise, payroll taxes in Brazil make business very difficult to conduct “legally”. Most firms choose to “employ” workers as “shareholders” or contractors to avoid the 70-85% payroll taxes (Mazzini, Interview). Lastly, the country could expand in great lengths with better roads and infrastructure allowing citizens and corporations to more efficiently travel and conduct business throughout the entire country. Currently, a great majority of Brazil’s GDP is produced in the states of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais. Despite these issues, Brazil is a great business destination due to many positive situations the economic environment offers.
The past ten years Brazil has developed sound fiscal policies including high interest rates, a simplification of its tax system, and balancing its budget. These policies lead most economists to believe that Brazil is a stable country that will continue to rise on to the world stage. There is very little concern for Brazil to have a major economic crisis and currency devaluation (See Appendix A:A3) as the country maintains a flexible exchange rate, a current account surplus, and a budget surplus. Investors are finding the real and Brazil, more and more, a safe investment and a promising economy to invest in.
Investors should be surprised that Brazil accounts for half of South America’s GDP – over $2 trillion. However, the bottlenecks mentioned above are proving stifling as the economy is expected to grow between four and five percent the next five years (EIU Forecast: Brazil, 4). Some economists have even recommended removing the B from BRICs due to Brazil’s slowing.
Bargaining in Brazil
Compared to other Latin American countries, Brazil is a very developed business environment. Most companies around the world would find that their industry is already represented in Brazil due to the highly skilled workforce, vast natural resources, economic stability and size. However, this does not negate the fact that a company could not earn favorable treatment in Brazil.
Thanks to the federal system Brazil employs, 27 states have been known to vie for investment in their municipality as opposed to another. Many states have their own foreign investment promotion agencies that will negotiate with investors and corporate strategic planners. However, history has proven that many manufacturers who intend to sell to the Brazilian market may want to focus on the major economic players. This is due to poor infrastructure in many of the outlying states and the fact that over half of Brazil’s GDP is generated from its three major states in the southeast – Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais (Nelson, Thunderbird).
In these well established state economies there is little bargaining power in the hands of manufacturers. However, as Brazil continues to develop its outlying states, many opportunities may present themselves for investors, introducing more competition and bargaining.
Chile
Political Assessment
Maturing as a brilliant economy in South America, Chile has traveled a long road to economic freedom and prosperity. Under a military dictatorship until the early 1990s, Chile has been democratically electing leaders who have continued the “Chilean Model”, economic liberalizations started under the rule of Augusto Pinochet – dictator from 1973 through 1998 (although presidents were democratically-elected, Pinochet was Commander in Chief through 1998). In 2009 Chile elected Sebastian Pinera, a conservative businessman who narrowly defeated his left-wing opponent.
Like many other Latin American countries left-center leaders are well fit to make free-market, pro-business reforms due to their political credentials. Pinera does not enjoy these credentials. Besides this fact, there are still good prospects for pro-market economic reform, although Chile does not have a long way to go in the grand scheme of things. Chile, much like the US, is represented in government by two leading coalitions – a center-left and center-right group – making for a consolidated political party system in Latin American terms. Although Pinera’s political credentials are not favorable – he is a conservative who will try to reform the country with conservative initiatives – he has tremendous leadership skills and a high political consensus behind him (formerly, Pinera owned Chilevision and 27% of LAN Airlines). (For details about Chile and the Packenham Model see Appendix A – A3).
Chile is considered a very stable democracy and economy. It is expected to continue the “Chilean Model” with a general consensus on economic policies. Furthermore, Chile is much like the economy of an island. It currently has over 50 free trade agreements with countries around the world; it is an APEC member and Mercosur “associate” member (Nelson, Thunderbird). Chile is expected to continue its market-oriented reforms and become the first “developed” country of South America.
Economic Assessment
It is nice that this paper intends to identify the economies of Chile and Brazil because Chile is becoming Brazil’s competitor when it comes to GDP growth and the overall economy. Although Chile is a fraction of the population and size of Brazil (population: 17 million to Brazil’s 200 million; total area: 292,000 to Brazil’s 3.2 million) it is operating a much more efficient economy and workforce. Chile is expected to grow between five and six percent in the next five years where Brazil is expected to be between four and five percent. Chile also maintains very low inflation and has an overall freer economy than any other South American nation.
Its Fiscal Rule restricts the government from running budget deficits – the government must actually maintain at least a 0.5% surplus. Chile also operates an independent Central Bank and maintains a flexible exchange rate. Chileans enjoy the largest GDP per capita in South America - $14,385 (EIU Forecast: Chile).
Looking ahead, there is slight chance of currency devaluation in Chile (Hispkind Model – Appendix A:A3). Both the current account deficit and budget deficit is very small (EIU Forecast: Chile) while Chile holds large surpluses in both foreign reserves and foreign debt – more money is owed to Chile than vice versa (Banco Central de Chile). Also in the works are free trade agreements with India, New Zealand, and Vietnam among others. One of the only drawbacks in Chile is the need for labor reform, like most all previously-populist economies in South America. It is generally easy to hire employees, and very difficult to fire them leading to major inefficiencies in business.
Bargaining in Chile
Bargaining in Chile is much more of an option than in Brazil due to the stage Chile is in its growth. Chile’s economic development agency, CORFO (Corporacion de Fomento de la Produccion), is in the business of landing investment in Chile. Chile was mentally crushed after losing a major investment from Intel Corporation to Costa Rica and now is more active in promoting investment within its borders. Roy C. Nelson explains in Harnessing Globalization that Chilean government officials were anxious to move its economy into other sectors “given Chile’s emphasis on commodity exports” (Nelson, Harnessing Globalization, 121). Today, Chile and CORFO are still actively looking for investment and investors do hold some bargaining power.
However, bargaining power would hold true more so for high technology firms compared to manufacturing or extractive-industries. Although K-Fit does manufacture some value-added products, apparel products do not rely on high value adding labor or technology. Nevertheless, Chile is the economy where K-Fit would more likely have a chance to earn to favorable incentives to opening its manufacturing and retail stores there.
Conclusion
The two economies discussed are two very different creatures. Brazil is an enormous economy and would easily support K-Fit’s business model by manufacturing and selling in Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, or Minas Gerais. Chile is richer per capita, more developed through the entire country, and a freer market, however, it is a fraction of the size of Brazil – much more like a test market than a large market.
K-Fit should decide whether it wants to dive into South America, and sell “in-country” and abroad from Brazil or if it would like to test the brand in South America by setting up in Chile. Prior to making this decision K-Fit should contact CORFO of Chile and the state investment agencies of Sao Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, and Minas Gerais to inquire about incentives. There are many factors to consider, this report was intended to give an overview of the top two markets K-Fit should inspect prior to entering South America.
Works Cited
EIU Forecast – Brazil. The Economist Intelligence Unit. January 2011: London, UK.
EIU Forecast – Chile. The Economist Intelligence Unit. January 2011: London, UK.
Mazzini, Milena. Personal business interview on conducting business in Brazil. Madrona, Hong, Mazzuco - Sociedade de Advogados. March 4, 2011.
Nelson, Roy C. “Harnessing Globalization”. 2009: The Pennsylvania State University Press.
Nelson, Roy C. Santiago, Chile Regional Business Environment Lectures. Thunderbird School of Global Management. February 21 – 27, 2011.
Appendix A
A1 – Brazil: Packenham Model Assessing Prospects for Economic Reform
Characteristic
Unhealthy
Healthy
Political Party Systems
Fragmented
Consolidated
Political Credentials of President
Good
Good
Leadership Skills of President
Good
Good
Political Consensus
Low
High
A2 – Brazilian National Congress: Senate Election Results (October 3, 2010)
A3 – Brazil: Hipskind Model Assessing Prospects for Currency Devaluation
Characteristic
Unhealthy
Healthy
Flexibility of Exchange Rate
Fixed
Flexible
Size of Current Account Deficit
Large
Small (<5%)
Size of Budget Deficit
Large
Small (actual surplus)
Amount of Foreign Reserves
Small
Large ($270b)
Amount of Foreign Debt
Large ($310b)
Small
Political Risk
High
Low
Contagion Effect
Large
Small
A4 – Chile: Packenham Model Assessing Prospects for Economic Reform
Characteristic
Unhealthy
Healthy
Political Party Systems
Fragmented
Consolidated
Political Credentials of President
Poor
Good
Leadership Skills of President
Poor
Good
Political Consensus
Low
High
A5 – Chile: Hipskind Model Assessing Prospects for Currency Devaluation
Characteristic
Unhealthy
Healthy
Flexibility of Exchange Rate
Fixed
Flexible
Size of Current Account Deficit
Large
Small (<5%)
Size of Budget Deficit
Large
Small (<5%)
Amount of Foreign Reserves
Small
Large ($26b)
Amount of Foreign Debt
Large
Small ($2b surplus)*
Political Risk
High
Low
Contagion Effect
Large
Small
*Banco Central de Chile